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Versailles’s imposition of war guilt, a
loss of territory, heavy indemnities,
and disarmament. When France and
Belgium invaded the Ruhr Valley in
1923, they turned enmity into rage. They
caused such disorder and suffering that
they opened the way for radical movements and ensured that the German
public would support enthusiastically
Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland
in 1936. In other words, the French
invasion intensified German grievances
and helped to produce World War II.
Meanwhile, Britain in 1923 refused to
join what Silverstone calls the Ruhr
War, and the United States withdrew its
token occupation force. In 1936, Britain
resisted French pleas to join a proposed
invasion, because this, at best, merely
would have delayed German rearmament. Instead, the United Kingdom
doubled its defense budget in three
years. The real failure was in alliances,
specifically (1) the alienation of Italy
over its invasion of Ethiopia, (2) Belgian
neutrality and the country’s failure to
build its sector of the Maginot Line, and
(3) the Soviet Union’s breaking of its
defense pact with France by concluding
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Moreover,
Silverstone argues persuasively that an
invasion was unlikely to have overthrown, weakened, or deterred Hitler.
Finally, From Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s Iraq is useful for its clarifications
of this period for an American audience.
One such clarification concerns the
severe consequences of the Ruhr War.
The Germans tried passive resistance
but escalated to sabotage as the French
occupation became more draconian.
Strikes, unemployment, riots, starvation,
and hyperinflation spread throughout
Germany. Another clarification is
that British politicians who became
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celebrities in the United States for
their opposition to appeasement (e.g.,
Winston Churchill) were not, in fact,
such proponents of forceful action as
they portrayed themselves to be in their
memoirs. Silverstone demonstrates this
through newspaper accounts, public
speeches, and formerly confidential
governmental memorandums. From
Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s Iraq is
a useful warning against succumbing to the lure of preventive war.
KEVIN MCMULLEN

Last Mission to Tokyo: The Extraordinary Story
of the Doolittle Raiders and Their Final Fight for
Justice, by Michel Paradis. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2020. 480 pages. $28.

The April 1942 air raid on Tokyo—led
by then–Lieutenant Colonel James H.
Doolittle, U.S. Army Air Corps—marked
a turning point in World War II. The
“Doolittle Raiders” successfully attacked
the Japanese homeland for the first
time, and thereby shifted strategic
calculations in both the United States
and Japan. Although their daring
mission pushed the technological limits
of the day, most of the eighty Doolittle
Raiders survived the raid, eventually
returning home as heroes; however,
eight airmen were captured by the
Japanese. Last Mission to Tokyo picks up
the story with their capture and shows
how their legacy remains relevant—even
with regard to modern-day military
commissions at Guantánamo.
Using a nonfiction but narrative style
of writing, Paradis provides a wellresearched and easy-to-read account
of the captured Doolittle Raiders’ grim
fate, culminating in the U.S. Army’s
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effort to seek “justice” for them after
the Japanese surrendered. In doing
so, Paradis sheds new light on these
men, the military “commissions”
to which they were subject, and the
origins of common article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949—a
bedrock principle in international law
that ensures that captured enemies
receive “all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” (p. 342).
As a professor at Columbia Law
School specializing in war crimes
law, Paradis grounds the book within
his professional expertise. He first
recounts Japan’s prosecution of the
captured Doolittle Raiders in 1942,
which resulted in convictions for all
eight and death sentences for three. He
then details the investigation, charging,
and prosecution of United States v.
Sawada, et al.—the U.S. Army’s postwar
case against the Japanese convening
authority, judges, and prison warden
involved in the 1942 commission.
The Sawada prosecutors’ driving concern
was the illegitimacy of the Japanese
trial of the captured Raiders. Paradis
provides a harrowing and meticulously
documented account of how the Japanese
tortured the men into “confessing” and
then used those “confessions” in an illegal “show trial” to obtain convictions and
death sentences. As Paradis writes, the
prosecution viewed these actions as a war
crime akin to “murder,” but the “murder
weapon was paperwork” (p. 217).
While recounting the details of Sawada,
Paradis also comments on the World
War II legal landscape. Using two
notable military commissions of the
era as reference points—Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)—Paradis
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fits Sawada into a historical context
familiar to national-security-law
practitioners. While this comes at
the expense of some discussion of
the larger political issues in postwar
Japan, Paradis nevertheless presents an
authoritative account of the Sawada
trial in a way that makes it relevant to
the national-security community today.
Although Paradis does not connect
Sawada expressly to modern-day
military commissions at Guantánamo,
the parallels are obvious. U.S. prosecutors alleged that Japanese officials
illegally denied the Doolittle Raiders
prisoner-of-war status. They further
alleged that the Japanese extracted
“confessions” using torture. Notably, the
Japanese used “the water cure”—known
today as waterboarding—stress
positions, isolation, and starvation,
among other torture techniques (pp.
19–20, 22–23, 56, 122, 243–44). The
Japanese passed a law after the 1942
attack on Tokyo that declared the
air raid to be a “violation of wartime
international law” (pp. 113, 282); U.S.
prosecutors viewed this as an illegal ex
post facto law, “written after the fact
for the purpose of trumping up charges
against the Doolittle Raiders” (p. 113).
American prosecutors even charged the
Japanese military judges with denying
the Doolittle Raiders a fair trial.
Today, many of the same issues haunt
the military commissions at Guantánamo. For example, U.S. officials have
denied Guantánamo detainees formal
prisoner-of-war status. U.S. officials
tortured detainees using waterboarding, stress positions, isolation, and
dietary manipulation, among other
techniques—facts that Dr. James E.
Mitchell made clear in a military commission report in January 2020. Defense
attorneys, with Paradis at the forefront,
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continue to challenge the statute the
United States is using to prosecute
Guantánamo detainees, arguing that it
is an illegal ex post facto law. And just
last year, Paradis obtained legal relief for
a Guantánamo detainee after arguing
that the military judge was biased.
To be sure, the legal landscape for
military justice has changed since
Sawada. On the heels of World War II,
the international community expanded
the judicial protections in the Geneva
Conventions and Congress passed the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. These
changes tethered military tribunals
to widely accepted legal standards,
which steadily enhanced their judicial
character over the next several decades.
Do the military commissions at
Guantánamo honor that tradition or
resurrect the same types of injustices
the Doolittle Raiders faced at the hands
of their Japanese captors? Last Mission
to Tokyo is a must-read book within the
national-security community, especially
for people trying to place the current
military commissions at Guantánamo
in historical and legal context.

professional. It is a literary rarity, boasting exceptional scholarship, clear
arguments, and a writing style so
sure and compelling that the reader
is both disappointed and surprised
to finish the last of its 670 pages.
Nolan examines what might be termed
the cult of the decisive battle that
leads to sharp, quick victory, as well
as the near-mythical reverence that
military scholars afford to commanders
who emerge victorious from such
conflicts. While acknowledging that
decisive battles can happen, Nolan then
convincingly demonstrates that such
battles are rare, and many (if not most)
battles thought to have been decisive
were not. He argues that wars very
rarely are won in such fashion; rather,
they are grinding contests of strength,
attrition, and force that, as warfare
has evolved, increasingly exhaust
the victors and destroy the losers.

The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have
Been Won and Lost, by Cathal J. Nolan. Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017. 670 pages. $25.

The fact that some wars have been won
quickly—by great leaders who either created or benefited from the rare decisive
battle or quick campaign—has had a
pernicious effect on the evolution of military thought and culture. The so-called
cult of the offensive may have reached its
high-water mark in 1914, but it had been
building for centuries and still survives
to the present day. In contrast, as Nolan
points out, the benefits of defensive
strategies, of the careful husbanding of
troops and resources, rarely are extolled.

From first page to last, The Allure of
Battle is a remarkable, exceptional work.
Already gathering awards—notably,
the Gilder Lehrman Prize, recognizing
“the best book on military history in the
English-speaking world”—Nolan’s book
should be read by every serious student
of military history, as well as every
military officer and national-security

Nolan’s position puts him in direct
contradiction with canonical theorists
of war, including Carl von Clausewitz
and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Both argued
for the need to create the conditions
for victory through a decisive major
engagement. Criticizing these masters
guarantees that intellectual battle lines
will be drawn. The Allure of Battle then

JACOB MEUSCH

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

3

